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THE LEGAL CHOKEHOLD:
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN OHIO UNDER THE
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
by
LORRAINE K. PHILLIPS*

INTRODUCTION

Those of us who chose to pursue the education and expense essential to a
professional career likely entered the working world bright-eyed and eager, ready
to achieve greatness. Did it cross our minds that our jobs might not last forever,
that the sunny words we heard during our interviews probably were not
enforceable promises, and that it might be wise to seek formal job security
provisions in Ohio? After all, Ohio is an "employment-at-will" state.
This article seeks to present the employment-at-will doctrine and the theories
of its erosion. In particular, the article will examine Ohio case law from a
practical perspective, with emphasis on which theories are most likely to provide
successful arguments around the employment-at-will rule. In addition, the article
will reveal trends and possible future proposals to deal with employment disputes.
To provide a focus, let us imagine a young, outspoken, talented, and
ambitious female attorney. She is one of those eager individuals, who enters the
corporate world with absolutely no thought of job security. After all, why would
someone with obvious talent give a thought to the termination of employment?
She expects to be a star, and people do not lose their jobs when they perform
well, do they?
Suddenly the company's finances are in trouble and the doors will surely
close. Should the attorney await the inevitable? No, of course, she will
immediately seek another position. Now she is much more sensitive to the issue
of job security, but only from the perspective of the employer's financial wellbeing.
She is wooed by another corporation, whose representatives proudly describe
the company's holdings and obvious stability. They explain that joining their
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legal office would enhance the attorney's career, and her rise through frequent
promotions would lead her to personal financial security as well. Soon after a
tour of the corporation's lavish executive suites and an elegant lunch in the
executive dining room, she promises to consider joining the corporation.
After contemplating the assurances she has received, she decides to leave her
current employer before becoming eligible for a severance package. She will also
forego opportunities to join law firms with growing practices in her area of
expertise. She accepts the corporation's offer to join their "family."
The attorney leaves her job, moves to the new employer's city, rents an
apartment, and comes to work. She is presented with an employment application
which she must complete and sign. The acknowledgement language above her
signature contains the following: "I understand that I am an employee-at-will,
that my employment relationship may be terminated by me or the employer at
any time, for any reason, or for no reason. I also understand that nothing
contained herein creates a contract of employment and that no one except the
Chief Executive Officer has the authority to change the terms of this relationship
to create a contract of employment." She is similarly presented with an Employee
Handbook, which represents "Guidelines". The handbook prominently proclaims
that it does not create a contract of employment, as the employees are employeesat-will.
What happens if, several years later, the employee's employment is terminated
for refusing to admit to committing some contrived offense? Does she have any
legal recourse? What are her best arguments? Is she likely to succeed in a legal
action? Before we examine her specific situation under the principles determined
by Ohio law, let us take a more panoramic view of the employment-at-will
doctrine and its erosion across the United States.

THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE AND rrs EROSION
Employment-At-Will
Two-thirds of the American work force is governed by the employment-at-will
doctrine, which grants employers absolute freedom to discharge without notice or
cause.' The employment-at-will doctrine has been summarized as a rule under
which: "[a]n employer may dismiss an at-will employee for a good reason, a bad
reason, or for no reason at all. ''2 This common law rule was also paraphrased in

' Note, ProtectingAt-Will Employees Against Wrongfid Dismissal: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 HARV. L REv. 1816 (1980).
2 H. PERRITrrr, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTCE 1 n. I (3d ed. 1990). Perritt indicates that

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4
the Industrial Revolution led to the need for greater freedom in employment

terms than had been known
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Payne v. Western and ATL. RR:
[Mien must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they
please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for
no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an

unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employee may exercise in the
same way, 3to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the
employer.

In this way, on the basis of "freedom of contract," the law indicates that the
at-will rule reflected the mutual desire of the employer and employee to retain the
freedom to end the relationship at any time.4 The at-will rule provides that "any
indefiniteness about the intended duration of the employment contract
automatically creates the presumption that the employment relationship is
terminable at will." The rule discourages considering expressions of intent,
conduct or circumstances surrounding the employment "transaction." The

employment relationship is seen as a "series of unilateral contracts," whereby the
employee accepts the offer by continued performance.5

Perritt explains Horace Wood's version of the "American Rule" of
employment-at-will, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at

will. 6 Courts began to construe promises of "permanent employment" as
promises of "indefinite employment." An indefinite contract would not be
enforced unless the employee could prove the existence of independent
consideration beyond mere performance of the job. The presumption of
employment-at-will and the independent consideration requirement prevented
recovery for wrongful discharge under contract theory.7

under the traditional "master-servant" relationship. Id. at 8.
' Payne v. Western and Ad. RR., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v.
Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915). See also Note, Employee Handbooks and
196, 197 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Employee
Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 DuKE L.J.
Handbooks]; Note, Breach of Implied Contract in Employment: Modification of the Employment-At-Will
Doctrine in Connecticut, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 601 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Breach oflImplied
Contract].
" Note, Employee Handbooks, supra note 3, at 198-99. As the note indicates, this rule was harsh for
employees because, absent a fixed term, unlawful discrimination, or a specific constitutional right, the
discharged employee had no recourse against the employer. See e.g., Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich.
684, 687, 273 N.W. 315, 316 (1937).
Note, supra note 1, at 1818.
'Perritt, supra note 2, at 9-10. Perritt explains that Wood's rule became standard in most jurisdictions.
He also comments, however, that modern historians note that Wood offered little to substantiate his
position, citing four cases which did not truly support the adoption of the employment-at-will rule. While
it began as a presumption, Wood's rule became a "substantive limitation on employment contracts," often
precluding the enforcement of an informal employment contract.

Published
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In Adair v. U.S.8 , an agent of an interstate carrier was convicted for
discharging an employee because he was a member of a labor union. The case
involved a constitutional attack on the statute which made the discharge a
criminal offense. The court noted that it was part of every individual's civil
rights to refuse business relations with any person for any reason. "Equity will
not compel the actual, affirmative performance by an employee of merely
personal services, any more than it will compel an employer to retain in his
personal service one who. . .is not acceptable to him."9 While the Court
recognized the constitutional guarantee against deprivation of liberty and property
without due process, it found the employment-at-will doctrine to be a reasonable
restraint.
...the right of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for
whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever
reason, to dispense with the services of such employee. It was the legal
right of...Adair, however unwise such a course may have been, to
discharge Coppage because of his being a member of a labor organization,
as it was the legal right of Coppage, ... however unwise such a course on
his part might have been, to quit the service in which he was engaged,
because the defendant employed some persons who were not members of
a labor organization. In all such particulars the employer and the
employee have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that
In the
equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract ....
absence, however, of a valid contract between the parties controlling their
conduct towards each other and fixing a period of service, it cannot
be...that any employer is under any legal obligation, against his will to
retain an employee in his personal service any more than an employee can
be compelled, against his will, to remain in the personal service of
another."0

Many such nineteenth century concepts have been repudiated or modified.
Concern about employment relations has increased since the inception of
employment-at-will. The workplace has become significantly regulated to
promote unionization, prevent discrimination, establish a minimum wage, promote
health and safety, establish retirement security, and to devise programs to
8 Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
9Id. at 164.
'0 Id. at 174-76. See Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1417 (1967) and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.
1 (1915). As Blades clarifies, both Adair and Coppage were rejected as the industrial revolution destroyed
the classical ideal of freedom of contract on which these cases were based. Id. at 1418. In NLRB v. Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46, the Court approved the National Labor Relations Act's
protection of the employees' right to unionize free of intimidation and coercion and aimed at preventing
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4
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compensate for workplace injuries. 1
The importance of at-will employment to employers appears obvious when
considering the large number of terminations in the United States: perhaps as
many as three million non-economic based terminations per year, with the rate for
non-organized employees being twice that of unionized labor.' 2 The at-will rule
promoted economic growth by giving business owners control over the workplace.
Public interest concerns, as well as concerns about controlling the abuse of
managerial discretion, however, eroded the employment-at-will doctrine. This
erosion occurred first through statutes, and then through actual private causes of
action for wrongfully discharged employees.13 The at-will doctrine had given
employers sovereignty over the workplace. Because employees had no bargaining
power in their own economic or working conditions, employers had maximum
flexibility to retain or discharge employees at their discretion. Statutes were
eventually enacted to promote better labor relations, with little impact on the job
security of the vast majority of American workers who do not or cannot belong
to unions.'4
Professor Peck describes a termination scenario in his article to depict the
literal consequences of employment-at-will 5 . Peck's hypothetical employee is
a supermarket cashier whose employer says that there is no obligation to explain
the reasons for her termination. Without a union, the employee would have no
satisfactory means to grieve or protest her termination. A court would hold that
she is an at-will employee, terminable without cause. Prospective employers may
ask why she was terminated. If she lies, she may be discovered and therefore
lose a job opportunity, whereas if she truthfully indicates that the employer
refused to provide a reason, dishonesty may be presumed. She would thereby be
rendered unemployable in what may be her only area of experience and one of
the few areas in which she is competent, suffering this deprivation without
hearing or proof of cause. Peck assumes that, given the favored position of

"Note, supra note 1, at 1826-27.
Stieber & Baines, The Michigan Experience with Employment-At-Will. 67 NEB. L. REV. 140, 141
(1988). This article cites Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937) for the traditional
12

at-will rule as it was once applied in Michigan. Where the employee understood he had a permanent
position, the court found that, in the absence of distinguishing features or additional consideration for the
services to be rendered, the contract was an indefinite hiring, terminable at the will of either party. Id

at 145.
3
Mallor. Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 26 WM. & MARY L REV.
449 (1985). Mallor noted that, per Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Company. 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.
1983). at least 29 jurisdictions recognize some private right of action, although there is no theory accepted
by all states and no agreement whether the action sounds in tort or contract.
14 Id. at 455.
"sPeck, Unjust DischargesFrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OIUO ST. Ll. 1, 4-6
Published
(1979). by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
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employers, it is likely that few suits will be brought by at-will employees. 6
Peck estimated that 60-65% of the non-agricultural work force in the United
States is terminable at-will.' 7 He indicated in 1979 that there were as many as
300,000 discharge and discipline cases per year that would have been subject to
grievance and arbitration had the employees been unionized, which could mean
that a substantial number of the decisions would have been overturned during the
process. Instead, the many at-will employees are left without remedy, bearing the
burden of a substantial injury' 8
In his often-quoted article, Professor Blades notes that the freedom of the
individual is threatened whenever there is dependence upon a private entity with
more power than the individual, a generality which is true in employment
relationship.1 9 He explains that this is the imbalance that led to unionism. He
uses B.F. Goodrich v. Wohlgemuth20 to illustrate his point. Due to his
comparative immobility, the worker is highly vulnerable to private economic
power.
As technological advances require specialization, the range of
employment alternatives narrows. Therefore, concern over job security increases
and workers are more easily oppressed. Because employers under the at-will
doctrine can terminate employees for good cause, no cause or even cause that is
morally wrong without incurring liability, the employee is forced to rely on the
employer's whim for preservation of his livelihood, tending to make him a "docile
follower" of the employer's every wish.2 '
Blades believes that the philosophy giving rise to the employer's dominion
over the employee, including the arbitrary right to employ or discharge without
regard to motive, may have fit the "rustic simplicity of the days when the farmer
or small entrepreneur who may or may not have employed others, was the
epitome of American individualism." 2 But he finds the philosophy incompatible
with modem large, impersonal corporate employers. In 1967, however, the courts
strictly adhered to the traditional rule that, in the absence of a statute or
agreement limiting the right of discharge, the employer may discharge an
employee at any time for any reason."

1d. at 4-6.

Id.
I

at 9.

Is
Id. at 10.

"Blades, supra note 10, at 1404. This early article urges the erosion of the at-will doctrine.
The B. F. Goodrich
20 B.F. Goodrich v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963).
employee in this case was enjoined from working for one of the few other companies in existence which
designs and manufactures space suits, based on his knowledge of trade secrets.
21 Blades, supra note 10, at 1405.
22

d. at 1416.

23Id.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4
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Arbitrary or economically unjustified dismissals have detrimental
repercussions. 2' Empirical studies indicate that discharge from employment
affects self-perception as much as economic well-being. 25 The fear of discharge
and vulnerability to employer coercion continue, especially among the increasing
number of white collar
workers whose jobs are least likely to be protected by
26
collective bargaining.
The Erosion of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine
The employment-at-will doctrine continues to provide a presumption that a
dismissal is legal. The employee must rebut the presumption." Courts are
becoming more receptive to awarding punitive damages in tort or for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, in cases involving the abuse
of power in the contractual employment relationship. This reflects changing
views about the responsibilities of those who possess economic power.2
Professor Blades agrees that employers should be able to discharge employees for
failure or refusal to do work in accordance with the employer's direction, as is
management's prerogative. His concern involves those areas of an employee's
life that have little or no relevance to the employment relationship; he maintains
that the courts should balance the business interest of the employer and the
personal interests of the employee. 29 Many courts and academics have supported
the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine to varying degrees and by using
varied theories.
There have been traditional exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine for
many years. These include: 1) company executives, entertainers and other highly
paid employees who have sufficient individual bargaining power to obtain an
express contract for a definite term, wherein the duty to discharge only for just
cause is expressed or implied in law; 2) employees covered by collective
bargaining agreements which contain a just cause provision; and 3) public
employees who are entitled by statute or regulation to just cause for discharge and

24 Note, Breach of Implied Contract, supra note 3, at 606.

See also Tobias, Current Trends in
Employment DismissalLaw: The Plaintiffs Perspective, 67 NEB. L REV. 178, 181 (1988).
25 Id. at 606-607.
26 Id. at 609. See also Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L REV. 1404, 1406, 1418 (1967); Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom
Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO STATE L. 1, 10 (1979).
27
Perritt,The Futureof Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self-Interest Lie?, 58 U. QN.

L. REV. 397 (1989).
Mallor, supra note 13, at 485.

21

Published
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due process.3 °
Until relatively recently, there was no tort of wrongful discharge. However, the
just cause concept was, however, developing in labor arbitration cases. Jobs have
become more important; the career and workplace often become one's life
focus.3 ' Discharge has been labeled the capital punishment of the industrial
world because of its devastating effects: severe economic hardship, imminent
stoppage of medical coverage, intense emotional distress and from being labeled
a failure, inevitable tremendous loss of self-esteem, the harm to reputation, loss
of standing in the eyes of family, friends, and co-workers, and of course,
difficulty in finding a new job.32 During the last twenty years, there has been
a veritable explosion in the area of employee rights. 33 The employment-at-will
doctrine began to erode in the 1970's as courts found remedies for victims of
outrageous discharge. 34
Mr. Tobias, a plaintiffs' attorney in Cincinnati, indicates that most people
believe it is illegal to discriminate for any arbitrary reason. He also suggests that
most workers believe that unequal treatment, solely because of a personality
conflict unrelated to work, is also illegal.35 Increased public awareness of
dismissed employees has resulted in at least five trends: 1) discharged employees
being more likely to seek counsel, 2) more employees threatening litigation, 3)
more attorneys specializing in employment law, 4) law schools broadening their
curriculum in the area, and 5) increasing law suits. 36
In the employment relationship, mutuality of contract is an illusion. The
employer possesses the predominant power in the bargaining relationship. Blades
states that the employee's right to work for whomever he chooses is "too valuable
to be circumscribed or limited" in order to prevent the abuse of the coercive
power of the employee's threat to quit his job.37 The employer is clearly the
party with the power to coerce and intimidate, a recognition of which provides
a foundation for various regulations in the workplace. 31 Where an employee's

30

Tobias, supra note 24, at 179-80. Tobias explains that the remaining non-union private sector exceeds
60% of the work force with no blanket protection from the at-will doctrine. He does note, however, that
there is limited special purpose legislation prohibiting discrimination and retaliatory discharge for the
exercise of a statutory or constitutional right.
3" Id. at 181.
32 Id.
33

Id. at 182.

341d. at 183.
5

id.

6

' Id. at 185.
37 Blades, supra note 10, at 1425-26.

3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4
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experience is of special value or where advanced age makes it doubtful he can
readily obtain comparable employment, the employee becomes even more
susceptible to the employer's coercive power and less likely to succeed in
mitigating damages.3 9 Blades urges that abusive terminations become recognized
causes of action, with punitive damages available as a deterrent.4° Blades
heralds the onslaught of employment litigation which has become the topic of
whole courses of study. Indeed, as noted by at least two commentators, quoting
Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Company,4 ' as of 1983, courts in 29 states had
already granted some form of exception to the common law rule, and 5 additional
states and the District of Columbia had indicated a willingness to do so.
In 1967, Blades advocated a personal remedy for damages in discharge cases,
including coverage for the expenses of a job search, lost earnings, the difference
in earnings if the employee must settle for a lesser paying job, and emotional
damages for the stigma and mental anguish attached to the job loss. Blades
recognized that employees are not psychologically prepared for the loss of
security and status inherent in the job loss. One of the reasons behind his
advocating a new cause of action for abusive discharge is his realization that the
fear of discharge and "vulnerability to coercion" is especially "acute" among
professionals and white collar employees. He urged a cause of action to
discourage interference with the freedom and integrity of such employees.42 The
law has evolved in the very direction Blades espouses in his ideology. Workers
are now being protected in the courtroom.
According to Professor Massingale:
[M]any changes in the law have contributed to the creation of the current
employment environment. During the last 25 years, security for the
worker has been encouraged by court decisions curtailing the unrestricted
right of an employer to dismiss a worker arbitrarily. The process began
clearly point to
slowly, but it has gained momentum as recent decisions
43
doctrine.
employment-at-will
the
of
the erosion
She points out that a number of early decisions were based on statutes, but
that, in the 1980's, courts began to recognize an action for wrongful termination

3' Blades, supra note 10, at 1426.
4

Id. at 1427.

4' 721 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983). See Note, Employee Handbooks, supra note 3, at 199; Mallor, supra

note 13, at 452.
42 Blades,

supra note 10, at 1413-14. Professor Peck feels that the failure of the law to protect against

unjustifiable dismissal reflects that our standards are lower than those of other economically developed
countries and some less developed. Peck, supra note 15, at 12-13.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
"' Massingale, At-Will Employment: Going, Going.... 24 U. Ric. L REv. 187, 189 (1990).
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on other theories. By 1985, 37 states recognized the public policy exception to
the at-will doctrine, 31 recognized the implied contract exception and five
recognized the covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception."
1. The Public Policy Exception
In some states, an employee may recover in tort when the discharge offends
public policy. Perritt identifies the elements of proof under the public policy
theory:
1. A clear public policy manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute
or administrative regulation, or in the common law;
2. The dismissal in issue would jeopardize the public policy;
3. The dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy;
4. Lack of legitimate business justification for the dismissal.4 5
When an employee asserts a claim under the public policy theory, a balancing
analysis incidentally weighs the employee's interest in job security against the
employer's economic interest in having the unilateral right to make employment
decisions. In this balancing, however, societal interests are weighed most heavily.
The employment-at-will rule, the societal interest which favors the employer,
remains a presumption. Unless the employee can show countervailing public
policy interests, the employment-at-will doctrine mandates that the employer
escape liability. 46 States have accepted the public policy exception in varying
degrees, and some have not accepted it at all.
The New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize the tort cause of action
in Murphy v. American Home Products,47 stating that "such recognition must
await action of the Legislature. ' ,48 Professor Mallor feels that the heart of the
problem with this theory is its imprecision, that is, the need to define the societal
interest at stake.4 9 The Plaintiff in Murphy based his suit on the allegation that
he was terminated in retaliation for reporting to top management what he
considered to be accounting improprieties. The court found that the rule of nonliability for the discharge of an at-will employee should only be amended through

44Id. at n.12.

4-Perritt, supra note 2, at 3.
4Id. at 30.

47Murphy v. American Home Products, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E. 2d 86, 461 N.Y.S. 232 (1983).
48 Id. at 87, 4955.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4
49Mallor, supra note 13, at 460.
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50
a "statutory scheme."

Courts generally attempt to balance the importance of the public policy
against the burden of limiting management discretion and usually require a clear
mandate that the particular policy is necessary to protect the public interest."
There must be a connection between the termination and the acknowledged public
policy separate from the interest in the stability of labor relations. Thus, under
this theory, the employee's interests are said to be furthered only incidentally to
society's interests. 2 Public policy protection cases generally fit into three
categories:5 3 1) discharge for exercising a statutorily conferred right,54 2)
discharge for refusal to disobey a law, 55 and 3) discharge for whistleblowing or

in retaliation for informing about the violation of a law.'
Most courts require that an employee be able to point to a clear mandate of
public policy as expressed in existing law.57 In Brockmeyer v. Dunn &
Bradstreet5', an employee was terminated following a relationship with his
secretary, her subsequent termination, and her suit for sex discrimination. In his
suit, the employee alleged that he was terminated for refusal to lie on behalf of
the employer in his secretary's sex discrimination suit. The court failed to find
a clearly defined public policy against discharging an employee because his
testimony may be contrary to the employer's interests.59 Courts are unlikely to
intervene where the discharge involves private disputes and internal matters, in
deference to the policy favoring employer discretion in the workplace.60

oMurphy, 58 N.Y. 2d at 293, 448 N.E. 2d at 90, 461 N.Y.S. 232. In fact, the court eliminated Murphy's
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, refusing to permit the Plaintiff to "subvert the
traditional at-will contract rule by casting his cause of action in terms of a tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress." The New York Court clearly intended to avoid creating a tort for wrongful
termination couched in any theory. Id.
s'Massingale, supra note 43, at 191.
52 Mallor, supra note 13, at 459.

Massingale, supra note 43, at 192-93.
s Sventko v. Kroger Company, 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W. 2d 151 (1976) (public policy exception
where discharge in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim even though the statute does not
prohibit retaliation). See Stieber & Baines, supra note 12, at 158-59. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas
Company, 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 115 LRRM 4611. (Recognition that an employee must be able
to exercise his right to claim workers compensation without being subject to reprisal in order for public
policy to be effectuated). Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (termination for exercise of
legal duty to serve on jury).
5" Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
(termination for refusal to commit perjury during government investigation of union).
mSheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc. 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (termination for urging
compliance with Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
"

57 Mallor, supra note 13, at 461.

"Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
9Id. at 572-73. 335 N.W.2d at 840.
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Plaintiffs are most likely to prevail when two factors are present: 1) the
policy is clear, i.e. specific and based on written law, and 2) the discharge
presents a clear threat of frustrating that policy. 6' Petermann v. International
Brotherhoodof Teamsters,62 serves as an early example of a case that obviously
fits these criteria. In Petermann, the plaintiff was discharged for refusing to
commit pejury. 63 The public policy was clearly stated in the California Penal
Code, making it a crime to "solicit the commission of pejury" and the public has
a great interest in the enforcement of the policy."8 The policy was embodied in
written law and the discharge was certainly in contravention of the spirit of that
law.
Nees v. Hocks,65 an Oregon case, is another example of an obvious public
policy case. The employee was discharged for performing her legal duty to serve
on a jury. Her employer asked her to request that she be excused, which she
failed to do.66 The court considered jury duty to be "high" on the scale of
citizen obligations, and so fashioned tort liability based on the employer's
interference with the duty.67
Other courts are willing to stretch to find statutory authority for the public
policy. For example, in Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company" ,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the public policy "derived" from
the Occupational Safety and Heath Act of 1970 which imposes a duty on the
employer to furnish a workplace free from recognized hazards. 69 The employee
was responsible for making bank deposits, but was terminated when the store was
burglarized after a deposit had not been made on the employee's day off. The
employer had cut the practice of providing a police escort during the daily deposit
procedure as a cost-saving measure, thus creating a "hazardous work
environment."70
It is doubtful that OSHA intended to address this sort of
practice when it imposed upon employers the duty of providing a safe workplace.
Even less reliance on a clear public policy was required in Novosel v.

61 Id.

at 462.

6,Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). See
also Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (employee discharged

for advocating compliance with food and drug statute).
6 id.

"Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 27.
65Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
"Id. at 212, 536 P.2d at 513.
67Id. at 219, 536 P.2d at 516.
" Cloutien v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
6Id.
at 923, 436 A.2d at 1144-1145.
70
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4
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Nationwide Insurance.71 This case broadly expanded the range of public policies
upon which to base torts by finding the "absence of a statutory declaration of
public policy" to be no bar to the existence of a cause of action.72 The plaintiff
was terminated for refusing to participate in his employer's lobbying efforts in
support of the "No Fault Reform Act" in Pennsylvania, and for privately stating
his opposition to the company's position.73 The Court found that the concern
for the rights to political expression and association expressed in both the U.S.
and Pennsylvania constitutions was sufficient to state a public policy. The Court
suggested that "general policies in society," such as the constitutional policy in
favor of freedom of expression, am adequate bases upon which to bring a public
policy tort action in Pennsylvania. Of course, private actors are not generally
subject to the prohibitions of the First Amendment. Novosel avoided the problem
by applying First Amendment principles as basic tenets of society.
These cases show the various stands that courts have taken with the public
policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Some courts refuse to
recognize the exception at all. Other courts recognize the exception where the
mandate of public policy clearly expressed in a statutory or constitutional
provision. Still other courts have gone so far as to base a cause of action in
general societal principles with a connection to constitutional provisions.
2. The Implied Contract Exception
In many states, an employee whose employer dismisses him or her in
violation of promises made orally or implied from a course of conduct,
employment policies, or handbooks may recover for breach of contract.74 Perritt
explains the three elements of this cause of action:
1. Employer made a promise of job security;
2. Employee gave consideration for the promise (may be in the form of
detrimental reliance);
3. Employer breached the promise by dismissing the employee without
cause.

7'

75

Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance, 721 F.2d 894, (3d Cir. 1983).

72 Id. at 899.

See Perritt, supra note 27, at 400; St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge
Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L REV. 56, 60 (1988); Grodin, Past,Present and Future
in Wrongful Termination Law, 6 LAB. LAW 97, 103 (1990).
73

Novosel, 721 F.2d at 896.

7"Perritt, supra note 2, at 2.
7 Id.
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Most medium to large companies have written rules, procedures, handbooks,
and/or manuals that may be construed as prohibiting unjust dismissals. These
written materials, considered with other indicia of the employer's intent, such as
verbal promises and company practices and customs, may raise an employee's
expectations of job security.76 The traditional view was that personnel manuals
and employee handbooks had no contractual status. Policy statements in a
personnel manual were mere unilateral statements by the employer and were
subject to unilateral amendment. Even promises, such as those of employee
loyalty, which benefited the employer were considered gratuitous and
unenforceable absent consideration independent of the performance of the job."r
In an increasing number of jurisdictions, however, employee handbooks are
found to contain enforceable contract rights.78 Implied contractual rights can be
found in the terms of an employee handbook, policy manual, memorandum, or
oral statements made by the employer. In examining the circumstances, facts or
employer assertions, courts may find either an implied contract for permanent
employment or an at-will agreement modified to become permanent employment
terminable only for good cause. 79 The rationale behind these developments lies
in the contractual principle of expectation. When an employer makes statements
or performs acts indicating an employee will be terminated only for good cause
or otherwise assuring job security, the employer creates an expectation of
permanent employment. Contracts are enforced to protect such expectations. s°
In the early 1980's, courts began to "take employers at their word."'"
Statements of policy in personnel manuals or handbooks or oral commitments to
employees at the time of hiring give rise to express or implied contracts that the
employees will not be discharged except for just causeY2 In Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc.,s3 an employee was terminated after 32 years of service. The court
noted that a variety of factors, in addition to independent consideration, come into
play in deciding whether an implied contract exists. "These include the
employer's personnel policies or practices, longevity of service, actions or
communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment,

76

Tobias, supra note 24, at 188.

" Note, Employee Handbooks, supra note 3, at 200-201.
7

Id. at 205.

79 Massingale, supra note 43, at 195.

so Id. at 196.

See Hershizer, The New Common Law of Employment:

Changes in the Concept of

Employment-At-Will, 36 LAB. L J. 95 (1985).
" St. Antoine, supra note 72, at 61.
32 id.
93 116 Cal App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
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and industry practices. '' 4 Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield 5 is a
seminal case in the implied contract area.
The Plaintiff in Toussaint specifically inquired about job security and was
basically told that he would be employed as long as he performed his job. His
argument that he should only be dismissed for just cause was strengthened,
according to the Michigan court, because he was handed a manual of personnel
policies which reinforced the oral assurance of job security.M The court held
that:
[E]mployer statements of policy, such as the Blue Cross
Supervisory Manual and Guidelines, can give rise to contractual
rights in employees without evidence that the parties mutually
agreed that the policy statements would create contractual rights
in the employee, and hence, although the statement of policy is
signed by neither party, can be unilaterally amended by the
employer without notice to the employee, and contains no
or
reference to a specific employee, his job description
compensation, and although no reference was made to the policy
employee does
statement in pre-employment interviews and the
87
not leam of its existence until after his hiring.
This theory of recovery allows courts to protect the expectations of the
parties.88 Toussaint, the leading case attacking the traditional approach to
employee handbooks, rejects the notion that handbook provisions must be the
subject of bargaining. 9
Courts relying on the implied contract theory of recovery have rejected the
traditional idea that independent consideration is necessary to support a contract
based on the employer's promises in its employee handbook. 90 The mere
performance of services is consideration sufficient to make the employee
handbook part of an at-will contract, whether the handbook modifies the pre-

4 Id. at 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26 (Many successful cases grounded in contract theory involve longterm employees).

"5408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W. 2d 880. Cf. Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 84848 (Michigan
Supreme Court July 31, 1991). (The Michigan Supreme Court recently refused to apply Toussaint when
pre-employment negotiations regarding job security did not occur). See also Stieber & Baines, supra note
12. at 140. Michigan's law involving the implied contract exception to employment at will is very
developed.
"Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
7
8 1d. at 614-615, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
u Mallor, supra note 13, at 456-57.
'9

Note, Employee Handbooks, supra note 3, at 209-10.
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existing contract or is part of the original contract.91 In a growing number of
states, continuing to work after the receipt of a promise of job security is
sufficient consideration, as it represents the detriment bargained for by the
employer. 92
Employers who are sensitive to litigation potential have sanitized handbooks
and inserted disclaimers to restate the employment-at-will doctrine and negate the
existence of a contract. 93 A clear and prominent disclaimer in the handbook
generally forecloses the employee's claims. 94 Disclaimers are a means for the
employer to preclude the enforcability of promises of employment security made
in the handbook or job application. Written or oral assurances of continued
employment may, however, vitiate the effect of a disclaimer. 9" "The principles
of reliance, adhesion, and legal presumptions against the draftsman may assist the
The
employee to overcome the unfair effect of these disclaimers. 9 6
sophisticated employer will not only insert disclaimers in employment literature,
but will also advise its staff to refrain from giving verbal assurances to employees
that may be interpreted as if the company will terminate only for cause.97
The employer's capacity to eliminate or restrict contract rights and policy
declarations is generally confined to enlightened firms. Oral assurances and
individual guarantees are most likely made to mid-to high-ranking management
personnel. Therefore, the persons who need protection the most, the rank and file
in small shops, generally have no implied contract rights. 9" Unilateral contract
analysis will not seriously threaten the employment-at-will doctrine because an
employer can still discharge employees without invoking the implied contract
exception, so long as the employer follows its own handbook provisions.99
3. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The third common law doctrine which has become an exception to the

91Id. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W. 2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (Provisions of personnel
handbook distributed after hiring may become part of original employment contract if meet requirements
for formation of unilateral contract, continuing to work sufficient consideration).

Perritt, supra note 27, at 412. Perritt also comments that, even where provisions are not "bargained
for," promissory estoppel principles should apply.
92

93Tobias, supra note 24, at 188.
" St. Antoine, supra note 72, at 61.
95Pernitt, supra note 27, at 417.
" Tobias, supra note 24, at 189.
Mallor, supra note 13, at 458. See also Williams, "Employers Can Avoid Legal Pitfalls in
Employment," The Daily Reporter (Columbus) September 28, 1990, at 5; and Spurgin & Hassman, The
At-Will Employment Doctrine And Employee Handbooks, 53 TEx. B. J. 27, 30 (1990).
97

98St. Antoine, supra note 72, at 62-63.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4
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employment-at-will doctrine is the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which
is implied in all contracts as a matter of law. This theory conceptually enables
the employee to recover for breach of contract when the employer violates the
covenant.'1° While the employer may terminate an at-will contract for any
reason, no reason, a good reason, or a bad reason, the employer also has a duty
not to "exercise this right unfairly or in bad faith."' 0 '
In its broadest
interpretation, Perritt indicates that a terminated employee need show:
1. An employment relationship;
2. Termination of the employment; and
12
3. Some aspect of the termination as unfair or in bad faith.'

In actuality the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not meant to add new
terms to a contract, but to enforce the intention of the parties to the contract In
other words, the covenant is implied so that the parties will not frustrate the3
contracts they enter. In his dissent in Murphy v. American Home Products,1
Judge Meyer applies the covenant to suggest that, where the employer requires
an employee to report on other employees, it is implicit that the employer will not
terminate the employee for following the instruction."
An interesting aspect of the development of this exception to the employmentat-will doctrine involves its remedies. While the language of the theory is
couched in contract terms, tort remedies have been provided by courts in the
states that recognize the covenant.L 0 5 In all states, parties to a contract have an
implied duty to exercise good faith and fair dealing in the performance of the
contract. This theory is used to avoid one party's interference with the
contractual obligations of the other party or his right to receive benefits under the
contract. In several states, the theory has been applied to the employment
relationship.'1 6
The concept of "fairness" arrived in the workplace with California leading the
way with large jury verdicts.' 07 In Petermann v. InternationalBrotherhood of

'00 Perritt, supra note 2. at 3.

1o1Id.
102id.

"3 Murphy v. American Home Products, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E. 2d 86, 461 N.Y.S. 232 (1983).
104 Id. at 313, 448 N.E.2d at 97, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
" See Massingale, supra note 43, at 198.
106
Id.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
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Teamsters, °8 the California Court indicated that it was "well settled that the
employer must act in good faith. ''t °9 In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.," 0
the company claimed the employee was terminated for theft and the employee
claimed he was wrongfully terminated on the basis of his union activities. While
California's labor code codified at-will employment, the court found that the fact
that a contract is terminable at will does not give the employer the absolute right
to terminate."' The Court recognized that the concept of good faith and fair
dealing was first formulated by the California courts in the insurance context, but
added that a covenant is implied in every contract, including one that is at-will,
that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to
receive the benefits of the agreement. 1 2 The court noted two primary factors
in finding the covenant: 1) longevity of service and 2) the employer's expressed
internal grievance procedure, which operated as a "form of estoppel, precluding
'13
any discharge of such an employee by an employer without good cause."
Again, while these causes of action were based in contract, the courts did not
limit themselves to contract damages. This is so even when the courts are not
clear that they are in fact applying tort theory. In December, 1988, the California
4
Supreme Court seriously evaluated this trend in Foley v. Interactive Data,"
and found that employees could no longer receive punitive damages in tort based
on bad faith dismissals because the cause of action actually rests in contract. The
Court thus overturned a long line of lower court decisions granting tort damages,
including Cleary.! 5 The Court found that there was no special relationship in
the employment context, such as there is in the insurance context, under which
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was developed. At least one
commentator applauded the decision, noting, however that the implied covenant
should never attach in the employment context because there is actually no

contract at all in an at-will relationship." 6

108
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).

'09 Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 28.

"o Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).

.' Id. at 450, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
"2 Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
" Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
"4 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988). See Massingale, supra note 43, at 199;
McGuire, Foley v. Interactive DataCorporation: The Implied Covenant of GoodFaithand FairDealing,
41 LAB. L. . 108 (1990) and Fenton & Miller, A Comment and Reply to "Foley v. Interactive Data
Corporation: The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing" by J.P. McGuire, 41 LAB. L.J.
307 (1990).
"' McGuire, supra note 114, at 109.
6 d. at 109-110. But see Fenton & Miller, supra note 114, at 307. These authors find a definite
contract
in the at-will employment relationship and believe that contractual damages are appropriate in18
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4
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As the common law rule of employment-at-will came under increasing attack,
some courts began to recognize that employers had too much discretion, allowing
them to take unfair advantage of employees. In response, some states recognized
the implied contract right to terminate only in good faith." 7 The trend started
in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company"8 There, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court found that a termination of an at-will employment contract which is
"motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest
of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of
contract.""19 Thus, the Court began imposing a duty upon employers to act in
good faith, although the covenant is not specifically20indentified. New Hampshire
has curtailed this trend since the Monge decision.
2
In Fortune v. National Cash Register,1
1 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court specifically supported the proposition that good faith is implied in contracts
terminable at will. Fortune, a 25-year employee, was terminated when he was on
the brink of closing a very large sale which would have entitled him to a
substantial bonus commission. In finding for the plaintiff, the Court determined
that there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
contract.'2 While not speculating as to whether the good faith requirement is
implicit in every employment-at-will contract, the court found a breach of contract
in the case. 2 3 It must be noted that it is a proper application of the covenant,
to enforce the existing terms of a contract.

Some states, such as Michigan, 24 have not adopted the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Perritt believes that California, Montana and Massachusetts
are the only states which rely heavily on the implied covenant as a primary
wrongful dismissal doctrine.'"

"t

Note, supra note 1, at 1817.

Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). See Mallor, supra note 43,
at 119; Note, supra note 1, at 1817.
"

"9 Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. (The terminated employee was a victim of sexual

harassment).
1 Mallor, supra note 13, at 468.
121Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (1977).
12

Id. at 103, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.

123Id.
"4 Stieber & Baines, supra note 12, at 150. The authors note that the Michigan courts have not adopted
the covenant and have defined public policy narrowly even though Michigan was considered on the
forefront of wrongful discharge litigation.
1"
Perritt, supra
note 27, at 421.
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4. Montana: A Legislative Response to Judicial
Erosion of Employment-at-Will
As the Montana courts steadily expanded the grounds upon which terminated
employees could sue during the 1980's, in 1987 the legislature began to respond
to the backlash of employers. 26 The Montana legislature eventually passed the
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act,127 while the courts expanded claims
based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and upheld large
punitive damage awards.
Montana employers thought the best way to change the direction of the law
was through legislative action.12 The Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act, which covers non-probationary employees, acknowledges the legitimacy of
public policy causes of action and those involving violations of written personnel
policies. 29 Damages are specified as up to four years' wages and fringe
benefits, representing a compromise between the traditional at-will rules and tort
1 30
damages, and have become the exclusive remedy of the discharged employee.
The statute, the only one of its kind, permits three causes of action: 1)
retaliatory discharge for refusal to violate public policy, 2) discharge without just
3
cause, and 3) discharge in violation of express written personnel policies.1 '
Remedies are limited to lost wages and benefits four years from the date of
discharge, with a duty to mitigate. Reinstatement is not available and punitive
damages are only available in cases of public policy violations with fraud or
actual malice. 32 Damages for pain and suffering or emotional distress are
prohibited. 33 Once suit is filed, under the statute's unique arbitration clause,
either party may request arbitration within 60 days. If the other party refuses to
arbitrate and then loses the suit, he must pay the requesting party's attorney
fees."
In August, 1989, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State

'26

Schramm, Montana Employment Law And The 1987 Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A

New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L REV. 94, 95 (1990).
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901-914 (1991) (The statute has been upheld against constitutional
challenge). See Schramm, supra note 124, at 95.
1-, Schramm, supra note 126, at 108. (Employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement or contract
for a specific term are exempted from the Act's coverage).
129 Id. at 109.
'2

'30Id. at 110.

Massingale, supra note 43, at 206.
" Massingale, supra note 43, at 207.
13 Schramm, supra note 125, at 110.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4
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Laws completed a draft of the Uniform Employment Termination Act, with
several provisions of which are modeled after Montana's statute. 35 However,
1
the plaintiff must exhaust internal grievance procedures before filing suit. 3
The proposed statute also provides the attorney fees incentive toward
arbitration. 37 The statute would specifically exclude from its application
employment contracts for a specific term, employees covered by collective
bargaining agreements, and government employees. 38 To date, no state has
adopted such a statute, embodying the ultimate erosion of employment-at-will,
other than Montana. Approximately 45 states have recognized some modification
have been
to the at-will doctrine, and bills forbidding wrongful termination
39
introduced to protect employees against unjust discharge.
In light of the development of the law in this area across the United States,
it will be interesting to examine how our young attorney will fare when forced
to rely on the current state of Ohio law.
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL AND ITS EROSION IN OHIO
Employment-at-Will
The employment-at-will doctrine is alive and well in Ohio. This can be
illustrated by examining, in chronological order, several cases which have upheld
the doctrine.
Henkel v. Educational Research Council 40 involves a written employment
agreement, whereby the defendant agreed to employ the plaintiff at an annual
salary. The Plaintiff contended that the offer of an annual salary, along with the
facts and circumstances surrounding it, created a contract of employment for one
year.' 4 ' The court identified the "modern rule":
[I]n the absence of facts and circumstances which indicate that the
agreement is for a specific term, an employment contract which provides
for an annual rate of compensation, but makes no provision as to the
duration of the employment, it is not a contract for one year, but is

Id. at 116.
'36Id. at 117.
'35

137Id. at 118.
'3

Id. at 125.

19 Employment At Will State Rulings Chart, Chart 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51 (August, 1989).
See also St. Antoine, supra note 72, at 57-58.
"o Henkel v. Educational Research Council, 45 Ohio St. 2d 249, 344 N.E. 2d 118 (1976).
14 Id. at 251.
344 N.E.2d at 119. 1991
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terminable at will by either party."'142
Because there was no evidence that plaintiff was offered employment for any
particular period of time, and the employer's policy forbade such a contract, the
employment relationship was terminable at the will of either party. 43
In another case, Susan Fawcett was employed by G.C. Murphy for
approximately 14 years before she was terminated for allegedly stealing a box of
cookies.'"
While the plaintiff believed that the right of an employer to
terminate employment for any cause and at any time should be limited by
principles which protect persons from gross disregard of their rights, the Ohio
Supreme Court felt constrained to follow its previous holdings and refused to
limit the employment-at-will doctrine. 45 Thus, if our young attorney faced
termination in the mid-1970's, she would have likely had no recourse whatsoever
under Ohio law, as it clung steadfastly to the employment-at-will rule.
In June, 1990, an Ohio, court of appeals decided Modarelli v. First Fed.
Savings & Loan Ass'n of Wooster,'4 which provides an excellent transition in
our analysis. The case examines the exceptions to the employment-at-will rule
recognized in Ohio, while stating that the employment-at-will doctrine still poses
a "formidable barrier" to employee suits.147 Modarelli, a vice president, was
terminated due to his volatile relationship with coworkers and employees under
his supervision. The Court noted that the crux of an at-will relationship is that
either party can terminate the relationship for any reason, but added that three
exceptions are recognized:
1. Facts and circumstances surrounding an oral agreement may give rise to
an implied contract that cause is required for discharge [cite omitted],
2. Detrimental reliance on promises of job security (promissory estoppel)
[cite omitted],
3. Discharge in violation of a statute and so in violation of public policy.
48
[cite omitted].

'42

Id. It is interesting to note that, while the court identifies this as the modern rule, it cites cases from

1882 and 1900 to support its position.
'4 id. at 261, 344 N.E.2d at 125.
i4 Fawcett v. G. C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 348 N.E.2d 144 (1976).
-i

d. at 249, 348 N.E.2d at 147.

'4 Modarelli v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n. of Wooster, No. 2529 (Wayne County, Ohio Ct. App.
June 6. 1990) (LEXIS Ohio Library, APP file).

147

id.

148 Id.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4

22

Phillips: Employee-At-Will
Spring, 19911

EMPLoYEE-AT-WiL

The first two exceptions are both based in contracL Therefore, the Court
points out the two theories under which Ohio courts have found exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine: 1) contract, or quasi-contract, and 2) public policy.
Like Michigan, the contractual exceptions are far more developed and the public
policy exception is construed narrowly. However, courts in Ohio find adequate
reasons to deny that the facts of a case fit an exception.
In Modarelli, the Court held that representations made to the employee that
his employment was directly related to his job performance did not create an
implied contract term that he could only be terminated for cause. 149 The court
bases its decision in part upon its determination that Helmick v. Cincinnati Word
Processing I1c.,150 a decision about assurances of job security, applied
principles of promissory estoppel rather than implied contract. The Court found
Modarelli's allegations insufficient to avoid the formidable barrier of employmentat-will.
As noted in Modarelli, however, other cases have been more successful in
escaping the employment-at-will's tenacious grasp in the Ohio courts.
The Public Policy Exception
At late as 1986, it appeared that Ohio might not recognize the public policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. In Phung v. Waste Management,
Inc.,5' the Ohio Supreme Court found that an at-will employee who is
discharged for reporting to the employer its violation of the law does not state a
cause of action for wrongful discharge. Phung served as chief chemist at a toxic
waste disposal site when he determined and reported that his employer was
violating its "legal and societal obligations."'
The Court held that Phung's
allegations failed to state a violation of a "sufficiently clear public policy" to
warrant creation of a cause of action.' 53
According to the Phung court, public policy does not require an exception to
the at-will doctrine when an employee is discharged for reporting to his employer
that it is conducting its business in violation of the law. 54 While the court did
not absolutely foreclose the concept of a public policy exception, it decided the

149id.

"o45 Ohio St. 3d 131, 543 N.E.2d 1212 (1989).
' Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986).
Is2
Id. at 106, 491 N.E.2d at 1119.
Id. at 102, 491 N.E.2d at 1116-17.
Is,
ld. at 103, 491 N.E.2d at 1117. The court specifically noted that the legislature had not formulated
a cause of action under such a scenario, although it had done so for a discharge for filing a workers
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facts of the particular case were insufficient to create the exception. It is
interesting to note, however, that the decision was written by the judge sitting for
Justice Douglas who could not participate because he had heard the case in the
appellate court. Had Justice Douglas, participated in the Supreme Court decision,
it may have been decided differently.
In 1990, however, Justice Douglas did have an opportunity to express the
Court's views. A public policy exception was found warranted in Greeley v.
Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors,Inc.' 55 Greeley was terminated as a
result of a court order requiring child support payments to be made by wage
assignment directed to his employer. His employer refused to withhold the child
support and terminated him. The child support wage withholding statute
specifically contains a prohibition against retaliatory discharge. 56 If employers
could merely pay a fine to avoid compliance, the legislative scheme would be
frustrated. 157 The Court found in Greeley the "clearly sufficient authority to
warrant" the public policy exception that was lacking in Phung.15'
Justice Douglas wrote, "...the time has come for Ohio to join the great number
of states which recognize a public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine."' 59 The Court held that "public policy warrants an exception...when
an employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason which is prohibited by
statute. ' 6° Although the employment-at-will doctrine remains "alive and well"
includes
in Ohio, the right of employers to terminate for "any cause" no longer
16
a discharge which violates not only a statute, but also public policy. '
The Court clearly leaves open the possibility of public policy exceptions other
than those for statutory violations, and allows the public policy cause of action
to be brought in tort," a significant development in Ohio law. The exception
does little for an "ordinary" termination of a professional. In the case of our
attorney who is terminated for insubordination for refusing to admit to a contrived
charge, a statutory prohibition does not come to mind. Thus, while principles of
fairness may certainly call into question an employer's action, an employee is
unlikely to succeed on public policy grounds unless Ohio extends the exception
to cover circumstances violating "vague" societal policies.

'

Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, 49 Ohio St. 3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990).

Id. at 230, 551 N.E.2d at 983.
IId. at 232, 551 N.E.2d at 984.
IId. at 233, 551 N.E.2d at 986.
59 Id. at 234, 551 N.E.2d at 986.
160 Id.

161 Id.

"- ld. at 235, 551 N.E.2d at 987. See also Hazlett v. Martin Chevrolet, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 3d 279, 496

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4
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The Implied Contract and Promissory Estoppel Exceptions
In 1982, an Ohio court of appeals recognized that employment relationships
of indefinite duration may be modified by an employer's literature, such as
handbooks and policy statements. 6 3 In Hedrick, the Court acknowledged the
Supreme Court's position in the 1976 Henkel'" decision that an employment
contract is terminable at will unless the parties agree to contract otherwise.
Despite the general employment-at-will rule, the courts were giving more
consideration to the intent of the parties.
Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 65 while not a termination case, acknowledges that
an employer in an at-will relationship may legally obligate itself by adding new
terms and conditions to the relationship. The case involved the enforceability of
the employer's severance package as expressed in the employee handbook and
orally. 1'
The Court used a unilateral contract analysis and found the
employee's continued performance of his job to be sufficient consideration for the
contract.'6 7 When faced with the disclaimer contained in the employee
handbook, the court determined that the verbal assurances defining the severance
provisions negated the disclaimer.'6
The Helle court noted the modem
decisional tendency against defeating contracts on the technical ground of lack of
mutuality and cited some of the most prominent cases in the area, such as
Toussaint'69 and Pine River.170 Although the Court in Bernard v. Rockwell
International Corp.17 1 distinguished the "Helle doctrine" because the case
involved severance rather than termination, contractual theories have flourished
72
in carving an exception to employment-at-will.
In 1985, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Mers v. Dispatch Printing
Company.7 3 While employed by the Columbus Dispatch, Mers was arrested and
charged with rape and other crimes. He was suspended without pay until the
criminal charges could be favorably resolved. The criminal case ended with a
hung jury and the charges were ultimately dismissed. The Dispatch nevertheless

'63 Hedrick v. Center for Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment, 7 Ohio App. 3d 211, 454 N.E.2d 1343
(1982).

'" Henkel v. Educational Research Council, 45 Ohio St. 2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 118 (1976).
65

Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1. 472 N.E.2d 765, (1984).

"Id.
6
at 7. 472 N.E.2d at 772.
67Id. at 9, 472 N.E.2d at 774.
'" Id. at 9, 472 N.E.2d at 775.
'9 Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).

Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
Bernard v. Rockwell Int'l, 869 F. 2d 928 (6th Cir. 1989).
'n id. at 932.
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terminated Mers' employment. 74 Mers claimed relief on a breach of contract
or promissory estoppel basis as a result of promises made by the employer and
its handbook75 provisions as well as its failure to follow its published grievance
procedures.
The Court refused to abolish the employment-at-will doctrine, instead citing
a line of Ohio cases upholding the rule. 176 The court found, however, that this
case "demonstrates that there are occasions when exceptions to the general rule
are recognized in the interest of justice.', 177 Although this is a termination case,
the Court cited the "Helle doctrine" as precedent: employee handbooks, company
policy, and oral representations have comprised components or evidence of the
employment contract. The Court had no problem applying promissory estoppel
to an employment-at-will case, remanding the case for a jury evaluation of the
meaning of the Dispatch's promise and whether the resulting acts were
reasonable. 178 The Court held that:
[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable and binding to oral
employment-at-will agreements when a promise which the employer
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of
the employee does induce such action or forbearance, if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably
expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so,
whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was
detrimental to the employee. 79
In this manner, the Ohio Supreme Court used the quasi-contractual theory of
promissory estoppel to find modification of the employment-at-will relationship.
Ohio courts have continued to adopt these principles.
In Brown v. Otto C. Epp Memorial Hosp.,' 80 the applied actual contract
principles in a termination case. Despite provisions in the employee handbook
to the contrary, the employer refused to reinstate the employee following a period
of medical leave. The Court found that an employee handbook or employment
policy may form a part of an employment contract and that, in this case, both

'7

Id. at 101, 483 N.E.2d at 152.

1I d.
'76

Id. at 103, 483 N.E.2d at 153.

177
Id.
"'

Id. at 105. 483 N.E.2d at 154.

79Id. at 106, 483 N.E.2d at 156.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/4

'goBrown v. Otto C. Epp Memorial Hosp., 41 Ohio App. 3d 198, 535 N.E.2d 325 (1987).

26

Phillips: Employee-At-Will
Spring, 1991]

EMPLOYEE-AT-WILL

parties intended to be bound by the provisions about leaves of absence.' 8 ' The
Court remanded the case so that a jury could weigh the evidence to determine
whether the employer gave Brown "good-faith" consideration for reemploymenL'
In another case, an employee sued the nursing home for which she worked
for breach of an employment contract. The suit arose after the employee was told
to either resign or be fired upon being given four written deficiency notices after
giving improper medication to a diabetic. 83 While noting unequivocally that
Ohio adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine, presuming an at-will
relationship in the employment context, the Court also stated that parties are free
to enter agreements which are for a specific term.M
Citing Mers, s5 the Court found the terms and representations in an
employee manual to be relevant in determining the nature of the employment
agreement and whether promissory estoppel is applicable.18 This development
in Ohio case law is very useful to our young attorney, as she struggles to
determine if she has a cause of action for her discharge. She was sensitive to job
security when she was engaged in her job search, and specifically addressed the
issue during the interview process. Although, in her naivete, her concern was the
financial security of the corporation, her questions elicited responses that reached
far beyond the company's financial strength. She was assured that her own job
performance would lead to frequent promotions and a swift rise up the corporate
ladder. In essence, accepting the company's offer of employment would mean
a "successful career."
We should remember that the attorney weighed these assurances heavily in
deciding to leave her job before becoming eligible for severance pay and in
deciding to eliminate potential opportunities with law firms. Clear arguments for
detrimental reliance emerge even before considering her relocation. The subject
of employment-at-will is never discussed. The employment application she signs
when she starts the job contains the disclaimer language. Her employee
handbook also prominently contains a similar disclaimer. Her best arguments
should focus, therefore, on the agreement she thought had been reached before
she arrived at her first day of work. Escaping prominent and unambiguous
disclaimer language in Ohio is not, however, a simple task. Later case law in this

...
Id. at 199, 535 N.E.2d at 327.
2
'8 id. at 200, 535 N.E.2d at 328. See also Boiling v. Clevepak Corp., 20 Ohio App. 3d 113, 484 N.E.2d
1367 (1984). (Parties to an employment contract are bound by principles of good faith and fair dealing).
18 Biskupich v. Westbay Manor Nursing Home, 33 Ohio App. 3d 220, 515 N.E.2d 632.

4

id. at 221, 515 N.E.2d at 633.

ID

Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).

"

Biskupich, 33 Ohio App. 3d at 221, 515 N.E. 2d at 634.
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area, perhaps alleging contracts of adhesion, may be more helpful.
In Uebelacker v. Cincom Systems, Inc.,' 8' the Court examined a claim of
promissory estoppel based on verbal assurances of job security, as well as a
contract claim based on provisions in an employee handbook. Although the court
upheld summary judgment on the contract argument because of the handbook's
prominent disclaimers, it remanded the case to the jury for a decision regarding
the promissory estoppel claim.' 8 The plaintiff in Stokes v. Worthington Ind.,
Inc.'8 9 also claimed detrimental reliance in his cause of action. Stokes did not
have a worthwhile contract cause of action based on his employee handbook
because the handbook specifically provided for termination for behavior such as
he committed.'
Stokes' promissory estoppel argument failed because he admitted that he had
not relied on the handbook; in fact, there was no evidence he had ever read
it. 9' The case serves as a reminder that the essential elements of the cause of
action must be met regardless of the factual scenario involved in a case. A
successful contract claim requires the employee's knowledge of the employer's
policy, and promissory estoppel requires reliance. An employee can hardly rely
upon a policy of which he is unaware. The case also reiterates92 Ohio's policy not
to recognize a tort cause of action for wrongful termination.'
Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing,'" involves a claim of sexual
harassment in addition to the promissory estoppel exception to employment atwill. The Ohio Supreme Court noted that, "standing alone, praise with respect to
job performance and discussion of future career development will not modify the
employment-at-will relationship."' 94 In this case, however, specific promises
were found to have been made upon which Helmick relied to her detriment.
During her interviews, she was promised job security and opportunities for

,, Uebelacker v. Cincom Systems, Inc., 48 Ohio App. 3d 268, 549 N.E.2d 1210 (1988).
1W I.
at 273, 549 N.E.2d at 1217-18. Please note that the court also addresses the issue of emotional

distress in the termination context After defining the elements of an emotional distress cause of action,
the court notes that an employer generally has a legal right to discharge an employee and bears no liability

for any emotional distress that might result from the discharge. In this case, however, the emotional
distress claim was based on more than the termination, ie. harassment, wrongful detention, defamation,
and assault and battery so that the issue of abuse of privilege was permitted to go to the jury. Id. at 275-

76, 549 N.E.2d at 1219-21.
"' Stokes v. Worthington Ind., Inc., No. 88AP-583 (Franklin County, Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 1989)
(LEXIS, Ohio library, App file).
19 Id.

192

Id.
id.

193

Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, 45 Ohio St. 3d 131, 543 N.E.2d 1212 (1989).

191
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95
advancement in consideration for her discontinuing other interviews.
Helmick was also induced to forego her search for another job while she was
employed by the defendant when her performance was praised, she was offered
a raise, and was assured that her career with the company was in order as long
as her job performance was good. The plaintiff's demonstration of detrimental
of job security can create an exception to the
reliance on specific promises
19 6
employment-at-will doctrine.

This case is very useful to our terminated attorney in her legal analysis.
Helmick's allegations that she was promised job security and opportunities for
advancement during her interviews formed the partial basis of her promissory
estoppel argument. The attorney in our case received nearly identical assurances
during her interviews. She also received praise during her employment, some of
which is evidenced by positive employment evaluations and generous raises. She
should also provide evidence of the calls she received from "recruiting firms" that
she did not pursue because she relied on the assurances of job security and career
opportunities. If she had actually begun to interview for jobs and then abandoned
the quest for a new job in reliance on promises and gestures made by her
employer, she should also emphasize these facts.
In Kelly v. Georgia-PacificCorp.,197 the plaintiff relied upon provisions in
company manuals in bringing a promissory estoppel claim. The Court stated that
at the heart of the Mers"98 opinion was its recognition that the history of
relations between an employer and employee may give rise to contractual or
quasi-contractual obligations even when the employment relationship is atwill. 199 The facts and circumstances surrounding the oral at-will relationship,
including the character of the employment, custom, the course of dealing, and
company policy can be considered to determine the employment "contract's"
terms concerning discharge. 200 Representations made by the company should
be viewed in light of their reasonable effect on the employee, i.e what the
employer should reasonably expect the employee to believe the promise means
if he acts or fails to act in reliance on the promise. °1 In Kelly, the question of
whether management was aware it had given the employee the impression he

s Id. at 136, 543 N.E.2d at 1217.
'96 Id. at 137, 432 N.E. 2d at 1218. Justice Douglas concurred in the decision, stating that he eagerly
awaits the time when the Court loses its view that one party can violate the rights of others with malice

aforethought. He again expressed his opinion that, whereas this type of behavior is not tolerated in other
areas of the law, it should not be tolerated in the employment relationship. Id.
97 Kelly v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 46 Ohio St. 3d 134, 545 N.E.2d 1244 (1989).
'9 Mers v. Dispatch Printing, 19 Ohio St 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985).
99Kelly, 46 Ohio St. 3d at 139, 545 N.E.2d at 1249.
Id.
2o0
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would be treated fairly was one for the jury, and the jury would analyze the
reasonableness of the reliance. 2°
In Williams v. CAP Gemini America, °3 the plaintiff raised the theories of
promissory estoppel and implied contract to avoid the employment-at-will
doctrine. Williams was recruited by someone who had worked with him at G.E.
and claimed that the letter offering a position constituted his employment contract.
He was not informed that he would have to sign another agreement, and indicated
that had he been informed about the at-will provisions, he would not have left his
job at G.E.2°4 The document establishing the at-will nature of the relationship
was not signed by the appellant until after he had quit his job at G.E. and started
the job with the defendant.20 5 These facts were sufficient to avoid summary
judgment for the defendant under the promissory estoppel theory.
The Court also recognized the implied contract theory recognized in Henkel,
Mers, Hedrick, Helle and Kelly, whereby oral representations, employee
handbooks and company policies have been recognized as components or
evidence of the employment contract. The defendant's offer letter containing an
annual rate of pay was claimed by plaintiff to be an employment contract; oral
assurances of job security were claimed to create an implied contract. Summary
judgment on this theory was also overtumed.2" The case illustrates once again
the difficulty Ohio courts have had in dealing separately with the implied contract
and promissory estoppel theories. The same passages of the seminal cases, such
as Mers, are cited by various courts as support for both. This is certainly
understandable because both theories are based in contract. Most states, in fact,
appear to treat both under the implied contract exception to the employment-atwill rule.
In June, 1990, an Ohio appellate court decided Masek v. Reliance Electric
Co., 2 07 a termination suit by a member of a corporate legal department.

Masek's termination was based on poor work performance, allegedly involving:
1) repeated complaints from corporate managers, 2) bad work habits, 3) poor
handling of contract negotiations, and 4) failure to provide essential documents

22

Id. at 140, 545 N.E.2d at 1250. See Worrell v. Multipress, Inc., 45 Ohio St. 3d 241, 543 N.E.2d 1277
(1989) (analyzing the computation of damages).
203 Williams v. CAP Gemini America, No. 56498 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 25, 1990)
(LEXIS, Ohio Library, App file).
20

id.

20 id.

206 Id.
207

Masek v. Reliance Electric Co., No. 56959 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio Ct.App. June 21, 1990) (LEXIS,
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Ohio library, App. file), rev'd, 60 Ohio St.3d 134, 573
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necessary for a corporate divestiture.2"' He argued that the employee handbook
and representations of continued employment conditioned upon acceptable job
performance gave rise to his claim of promissory estoppel. After a review of
Mers, Kelly and Greeley, the Court determined that the issue could not be decided
on summary judgment, but had to go to the trier of fact.2°9 The Court also
found that the issue of whether Masek's performance was deficient could not be
decided on summary judgment." °
It is clear that a terminated individual, such as our young attorney, may be
able to reach a jury under a contractual exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine. The ability to assert a cause of action will largely depend on the
employee's success in avoiding at-will language in company documents and
prominent disclaimers that the documents create any contractual relationship. Our
plaintiff should definitely claim reliance on specific representations made during
interviews, particularly those involving job security and advancement
opportunities. Timing is also extremely important.
In our scenario, the attorney should stress her reliance on statements made to
induce her to leave her job and forego her severance package, as well as her
relocation before she was ever given any indication that the employment
relationship would be "at-will." In particular, she should claim that any at-will
contract created by the documents which were provided following her detrimental
reliance would be one of adhesion. After all, she had no choice but to sign the
employment application, having already left her other job and having moved to
accept the new position.
Our attorney should also claim reliance on the employee handbook, despite
its disclaimers. She should emphasize any portions that encourage a sense of
"belonging" or "family." In addition, any provisions that imply an employee will
be treated "fairly" should be stressed. She should also use the employer's
progressive discipline policy to her advantage because the employer apparently
ignored it. Finally, she should argue that her employer should not be entitled to
promulgate and publish policies that encourage reliance and then escape objection
through the disclaimers. Of course, even if she reaches the jury, that does not
necessarily connote success. In Ohio, the terminated employee's best chance for
a successful dismissal suit does rest on contract or quasi-contract grounds.

209 id.

2m Id.
20 Id. The Court did uphold summary judgment on the claim of intentional infliction of emotional

distress, based on plaintiff's failure to demonstrate extreme and outrageous conduct by the employer so
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The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing
A few Ohio cases have alluded to standards of good faith and fair dealing in
the employment context. In 1984, in Bolling v. Clevepak Corp.,21 a severance
pay case, the Court assumed that parties to an employment contract, as with any
212
other contract, are bound by standards of good faith and fair dealing.
The Court in Mers made it clear, however, that it would follow the
Fawcet?13 decision and refuse to recognize a duty of the parties to act in good
faith. 214 In 1989, an appellate court clarified this position using the traditional
language used in employment cases.21 5
In this case, the plaintiff claimed a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. 21 6 In this decision, the Court cited the Phung217 case
as Ohio's position that an at-will employee is subject to discharge even if done
in gross or reckless disregard of the employee's rights.218 The Court noted that
while the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the insurance context, it refuses to do so in wrongful discharge cases
brought by at-will employees. The Court would not extend a cause of action for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to wrongful discharge
claims. 21 9 In Ohio, the implied covenant is not recognized and making a claim
based on its breach would be fruitless.
Recent Cases Upholding Employment-at-Will
It is important to understand that cases have still been won by defending with
the employment-at-will rule. It is useful to review a few of these recent cases.
In Bernard v. Rockwell International,20 the Sixth Circuit examined a case in
which Rockwell employees received and signed, when they were hired from other
companies, a "Report for Work Notice and Employment Agreement." 22' While
one provision set forth the employee's agreement to perform faithfully in
accordance with company policies, another specified the employee's
211 Bolling
212 Id.

213 Fawcett
234Mers
2'5

v. Clevepak Corp. 20 Ohio App. 3d 113, 484 N.E.2d 1367 (1984).

at 121, 484 N.E.2d at 1376.
v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 348 N.E.2d 144 (1976).

v. Dispatch Printing Company, 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 105, 483 N.E.2d 150, 155 (1985).

Kuhn v. St. John & West Shore Hospital, 50 Ohio App. 3d 23, 552 N.E.2d 240 (1989).

216Id.

at 24, 552 N.E.2d at 241.

217Phung

v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986).

218Kuhn,

50 Ohio App. 3d at 24, 552 N.E.2d at 242.

219

id.

220Bernard

v. Rockwell Int'l, 869 F.2d 928 (6th Ct.1989).

221Id. at 929.
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acknowledgement that he served at will and could be terminated in accordance
The handbook provided during orientation
with Rockwell's procedures. m
stated that the company would apply its rules in a fair manner and would use
progressive discipline in line with the philosophy that discipline would be
corrective rather than punitive. 3 Plaintiffs were fired for failing to attend a
management status meeting.
The court refused to recognize the Helle"u decision as precedent because
it involved severance pay rather than termination.m In addition, the Court
refused to recognize an implied contract. 226 The Court also found promissory
estoppel to be inapplicable because the employees only learned of the provisions
in the handbook after their arrival in Ohio, foreclosing the notion of detrimental
reliance.7
Clearly, the Sixth Circuit Court has been conservative in its
application of Ohio law. In several instances, however, the state courts have been
equally conservative.
Although Day v. American Greetings28 involves an injury and application
of a handbook's sick leave provisions, Day was terminated and filed suit for
wrongful tortious termination. The court states that "Ohio does not recognize
such a claim in employment discharge" so that the claim was properly dismissed
by the court below. 229 When contemplating a cause of action in this area, our
terminated attorney should recall Ohio's reluctance to recognize a tort of wrongful
discharge and so should be careful to draft her claims as fitting recognized
exceptions to the employment-at-will rule.
In Buddner v. Teledyne Republic Mfg., 230 however, an employee's attempt
to so draft the complaint backfired. The Court recognized that an exception to
the employment-at-will rule exists in Ohio when employee handbooks, company
policies and oral representations demonstrate the existence of an employment
contract. However, the Court found that the plaintiff was terminated for violating
company policy as stated in the document upon which she based her termination

2u Id. at 930.
223id.
2'

Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1. 472 N.E.2d 765 (1984).

225 Bernard v. Rockwell Int'l., 869 F.2d at 932.
2

W id.

n'ld. at

933.

Day v. American Greetings No. C-880644 (Hamilton County, Ohio CL App. Nov. 29, 1989) (LEXIS,
Ohio library, App file).
29 Id.
2" Buddner
v. Teledyne Republic 1991
Mfg.,
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claim."' In its inimitable way, the Ohio court warned plaintiff that she could
not have her cake and eat it, too. This case reminds us how very careful we must
be in drafting pleadings in this area.
232
The Ohio Supreme Court recently decided Karnes v. Doctors Hospital,
in which a terminated employee attempted to plead a contractual cause of action
based on an employee handbook. The attempt was unsuccessful because the
handbook contained prominent disclaimers of any intent to create an employment
contract and because the plaintiff failed to show that she was aware of the
handbook or its provisions.233 In addition to providing an indication of the
extreme difficulties in avoiding effective disclaimer language, the case reminds
employees to read the literature provided by the employer.

Summary
Our young attorney should be very aware of the strength of the employmentat-will doctrine in Ohio as she weighs her legal options. It is a very difficult
presumption to escape. Even if she avoids summary judgment in favor of the
employer, she is certainly not assured a favorable jury verdict, and if she does
win, she cannot presume that the award will be substantial.
There is another very important factor for the attorney to consider. The
lawsuit she is considering will take a severe emotional toll on the plaintiff. Not
only are there no guarantees of success, but these cases are very difficult and
personal for the individuals involved. Termination from employment creates
serious consequences for an employee, affecting every area of the employee's life.
Engaging in a law suit re-opens all of the wounds and allows dissection of each
in excruciating detail. Our young attorney must be willing to face the emotional
turmoil inherent in the suit before she files. For some, even with a potentially
successful contract or quasi-contract claim against the employer, it might be more
healthy to avoid suit.
One means of doing so would be to negotiate with the employer immediately
upon its move to terminate the employee. She could explain her potential rights
and inform the employer that a lawsuit can be avoided by allowing her to resign
with an attractive severance package. This should be given very serious
consideration.
Some sophisticated employers may in fact try to force an employee to resign
by threatening termination as the alternative. Courts in Ohio do not appear to
231 id.
232Karnes

v. Doctor's Hosp. 51 Ohio St. 3d 139, 555 N.E.2d 280 (1990).
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recognize "constructive termination" where an employee is essentially discharged
because the conditions of employment have become untenable. An employee
faced with such a situation can certainly call the employer's bluff, hoping that the
employer will not go through with the termination. The employee must, however,
be willing to deal with the termination if the employer does pursue it.
THE FUTURE IN WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LITIGATION

Most of the academicians quoted herein have opinions about the way
termination law should evolve in the future. Professor Peck, for example feels
that it is inevitable that employment-at-will will fail to survive.2 3 He thinks
courts will require just cause in termination cases as well as in serious discipline
actions.235
Peck proposes that employers in the non-organized sector provide limited review
by higher ranking personnel of decisions to initiate discharge, with the basis and
rationale being stated so that the reasonableness of decisions would be reviewed
by courts.2 36 Citing the products liability line of cases involving negligent
manufacture of products, Peck shows how the judiciary can be creative and
change the law.237 Limited review would bring to unorganized employees the
benefits of progressive discipline that are required by arbitrators in the organized
sector. The "due process" required in progressive discipline systems generally
includes the employee being informed of the existence of a rule, violation of
which will lead to discipline and possibly discharge. The first violation may
238
merit a warning, the second a suspension, after which discharge may occur.
Another judicial approach involves implying the duty to terminate only in
good faith. 239 The good faith standard allows the courts the flexibility to deal
with length of service, past performance, type and level of employment, and the
economic needs of the finn.24° Under this standard, employees could still be
terminated for poor perfomance. The proponent of this approach recognizes that
high level management must withstand increasingly subjective standards. These
employees should have to overcome a higher hurdle to show abusive discharge;

2m Peck, supra note 15, at 1.
m' Id. at

2.

Id. at 47-48. The author even suggests that the government's refusal to protect employees of an
indefinite term while it protects federal and union employees might be a denial of equal protection.
"7 Id. at 43.
2m

m Id. at 48. Peck notes that certain offenses should be grounds for immediate termination. He also
comments that moves by the judiciary to impose minimal due process requirements in these cases would
probably produce a legislative response recognizing a right to continued employment absent just cause
for discharge.
Note, supra note 1.at 1836.
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For
they owe the employer a high degree of trust and cooperation.2 '
who
are
middle-managers,
employees, such as foremen, salesmen, supervisors and
between union safeguards and the privileges afforded to top management, good
faith protection would be available. 2
Legitimate grounds for discharge under a good faith standard would include
incompetence, unsatisfactory performance after warnings, clear violations of
reasonable rules, unauthorized absence, and insubordination.2 3 The employee
would have the burden to prove the employers's decision unreasonable and
damages would include lost wages, the cost and inconvenience of a job search,
lost future income, moving expenses, mental and emotional distress from
embarrassment and loss of status, and punitive damages. 2'
Another author believes that the objective of wrongful discharge actions is to
correct the imbalance of power resulting from the inability of employees to
bargain individually for job security. 5 She doubts the ability of courts to
handle the litigation that would result from the imposition of a just cause standard
for discharge. Instead, she suggests that punitive damages would be a good
means to deter the abuse of power in the discharge contexL 246 The use of
punitive damages would express society's disapproval of the exploitation of
superior power and would create a strong incentive for employers to conform to
legal duties. In other words, a remedy that would get the attention of the Board
of Directors and the personnel office might halt abusive employment
practices.2"7
A practitioner in employment law agrees that employers have little incentive
in their treatment of employees absent fear of large verdicts.248 There are other
drawbacks to litigation in resolving employment disputes. An employee offered
reinstatement may be too upset to return to a hostile environment, yet the law
may require the employee to accept the job or risk losing the right to damages.
The duty to mitigate hurts those most aggressive in post termination job searches.
Many employees do not have the funds to pay a retainer to an attorney; those
who do have such funds tend to be at least middle-level managers. In addition,
many employees have a hard time finding counsel willing to handle their cases,

7A1Id.

24 Id. at 1840-41.
24 Id. at 1841.
244 Id. at 1842-43.
243

Maflor, supra note 13, at 489.

24 Id.
27 Id. at 496.
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especially where the potential for damages is not great.2 9
Several authors advocate legislative alternatives to judicial reform in the
wrongful discharge arena.2 ° Perritt finds it possible to draft a constitutional
wrongful dismissal statute that provides for adjudication in an administrative or
arbitration tribunal. 25' His suggestion for drafting includes the following
provisions:
1. Grant attorneys' fees to the plaintiff,
2. Codify the three common law exceptions to employment at-will (public
policy, implied contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing), and
3. Limit damages to back pay with a possibility of double or treble
damages.252
Perritt also feels that the enactment of legislation is unlikely, largely because
plaintiffs attorneys are satisfied with the status quo.253
Indicating that the time is ripe for legislation, Grodin identifies some of the
same problems with litigation as does Tobias.M Only employees whose status
and pay make litigation worthwhile are protected. Legislation would allow fine
tuning of procedures, such as the exclusion of small employers and the provision
of remedial schemes, and would provide blanket minimal coverage for all
employees.255 The Montana statute and the proposed uniform act assign
enforcement of the just cause standard to arbitrators, a more expeditious and costeffective procedure, using arbitrators with a reservoir of experience under
collective bargaining agreements. Problems, such as the finality of the award and
who will bear the costs, can be overcome. 2 s

29 Id. at 190.

2o See Perritt, supra note 27, at 422; McGuire, Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation: The Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 41 LAB. L.J. 108, 111 (1990); Grodin, Past, Present, and
Future in Wrongful Termination Law, 6 LAB. LAW. 97, 104 (1990); Blades, supra note 10, at 1433-34.
Blades indicates that legislation could vest exclusive jurisdiction to hear discharge cases in administrative
commissions, which have the advantage of administrative responsibility and expertise and can provide a
wide range of remedies. Blades, amazingly perceptive in 1967, also found legislation to be unlikely
without a strong lobby to promote iL
23'
Perritt, supra note 27, at 427.
"3 Id. at 430.
23

Id.

2" Grodin, supra note 72, at 104.

2w Id.
2Id.
at 105.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991

37

Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 3, Art. 4
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:3

St. Antoine feels that "the prevention of arbitrary treatment of employees may
be not only humane but also good business. Marked correlations have been
observed between a secure work force and high productivity and quality
output."2" Elimination of the employment-at-will rule would not mean that
American business would lose its competitiveness in the international market,
although the employers would lose some flexibility in job arrangements.
Protection from unfair discharge is provided by statute in about 60 countries,
including Sweden, Norway, Japan and Canada.258 Just cause legislation would
save employers from the financial liability of large jury verdicts if the remedies
are limited and the cases are adjudicated by arbitrators.
St. Antoine also recognizes that courts have no capacity to construct the
administrative apparatus necessary for enforcement and are not accessible to rank
and file workers. 259 He suggests that a statute be drafted which articulates a
standard in terms of just cause without further definition remaining silent on the
burden and quantum of proof.2" He would exclude certain employees, such as
those with a pension worth over a certain amount, probationary employees, and
employees with contracts for a fixed term. 26 ' He would similarly exclude small
employers, public employers, and employers whose employees are organized.2 62
He would specifically include discipline other than discharge and constructive
discharge.26 3 St. Antoine favors binding arbitration. 2 He feels the arbitrator
should have the option to award severance pay instead of reinstatement, plus back
pay, income for a limited time, and maybe attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party. 265 Like others, St. Antoine finds that unjust dismissal makes no sense
ethically; its elimination is becoming a moral and historical imperative. 2
Massingale agrees that the current system is expensive, time consuming and
does not serve the parties well.2 67 She advocates a new system which would
require good cause for termination and limit the employer's liability; she suggests
that arbitration would make recovery more readily available to wrongfully
terminated employees and would reduce costs. 268 She believes her solution is
25' St. Antoine, supra note 72, at 69.
2

Id. at 68.

2" Id. at
26DId.

71.

at 71-72.

6' Id. at 72-73.

IId. at 73, 76.
IId. at 76.
2"

2
2m

6

Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 81.
Massingale, supra note 43, at 187.

268Id.

at 188.
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sensitive to employers by limiting exposure to damages as well as defense
costs. 26 Adopting a system such as the one in Montana would lend more
2 70
certainty to the employment relationship for both the employer and employee.
Massingale favors the adoption of a uniform statute wherein damages would be
limited to economic injury for a limited period, with punitive damages either
She sees the
prohibited or available in very limited circumstances. 27'
advantages of a "good cause/dispute resolution via arbitration" system to include
greater certainty for both parties, greater consistency in272awards, increased judicial
economy and rapid recovery at a fraction of the cost.
Tobias thinks that a federal law with uniform standards is the best approach
to remedy the current ineffective system.27 3 He would combine all federal antidiscrimination and state claims in one hearing. He supports a short statute of
limitations and relaxed rules of evidence, with attorneys' fees going to a
prevailing employee, the government paying the arbitrator, and flexible
remedies.274
Other alternative solutions are a federal no fault insurance policy for discharge
and a statutory no-cause dismissal option, both permitting discharge without cause
coincident with mandatory compensation. 27 5 The "no-cause compensation
scheme" abandons the issue of just cause entirely, providing automatic
compensation for any termination as determined by an established formula.276
A statutory no-cause approach provides the payment of discharge compensation
as an alternative to litigating a wrongful discharge action. Five variables,
including length of employment and age, would be used in the formula to derive
the compensation. 277 If both parties accept the option, it then becomes the sole
remedy, and all other claims are waived.2 78
The federally mandated no-fault insurance system to settle wrongful discharge
claims is analogous to the workers compensation system.279 An employer can
dismiss an employee for any reason and the employee will be automatically
compensated. An employee would only be eligible if he signed a waiver of the
26

Id. at 202.

270 Id.
271

at 205.

Id. at 209.

272id.
23

Tobias, supra note 24, at 190.

274id.

27 Note, Wrongful Discharge: Proposalsfor Change, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 143 (1989).
276Id. at
277

150.

Id. at 151.

278 Id.
279 Id. atby152.
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right to sue at the time of hiring.2 ° In this system, the award is based on such
factors as length of service and salary.28 1 While employers generally oppose
legislation that increases liability, they may favor predictability in terms of
liability and costs. Defense attorneys may similarly favor predictabiity. 2 2 The
strongest opponents are likely to be plaintiffs' attorneys, who have the most to
lose.28 3
When he participated in a panel discussion in 1989, Paul Tobias, a Cincinnati
attorney, remarked that he had just attended a meeting of the Executive Board of
Plaintiffs' Employment Lawyers Association, during which the attorneys
responded with a resounding "no" vote to proposed legislation. 28 The law of
employee rights is just catching up to where it should be, and plaintiffs' attorneys
object to employers trying to convince the legislature to take away the employees'
rights and "give nothing in exchange."2 5 Tobias ends his discussion by stating
that we are in the midst of a "law revolution", as the erosion of employment-atwill has started to slow. He predicts that the solution will be a federal one. He
urges law students and academicians to help solve the problems, acknowledging
that professors started the erosion with law review articles and suggesting that
"maybe. they can bail us out of the current state of confusion. ,211
Professor Peck concludes his article with the hopes that he might help
convince the courts that they should abandon the employment-at-will rule, which
"does not accord human dignity the value it deserves and usually receives in
American law."2"
OHIO'S FUTURE

Although employers in Ohio have not felt the pressures of the commonplace
awarding of huge jury verdicts, and plaintiffs' attorneys do not favor just cause
legislation, a legislative scheme should be enacted. Perhaps there is a way to
draft a statute that would not be offensive to plaintiffs' attorneys.
The goal is to provide a remedy for those most often left without:

the

2" Id. (The Waiver does not apply to statutory claims).
22'Id.

at 153.
mSId. at 156.

2

Id. at 157.

2" Symposium: Beyond Collective Bargainingand Employment-At-Will, Panel Discussion, 58 U. CIN.

L REv. 431, 435-436 (1989).
mid.
" d. at 449-450. See also Grodin, Past,Present, and Future in Wrongful Termination Law, 6 LAB.
LAW. 97, 106 (1990).
n7 Peck, supra note 15, at 49.
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uncertain cases, the plaintiffs unable to finance litigation, or those unable to find
an attorney to represent them. In order to gain the support of plaintiffs' attorneys
and best protect employees, the statute should offer an elective remedy. In other
words, those plaintiffs who can find counsel to represent them in litigation and
can afford to finance it would remain free to pursue a lawsuit.
Discharged employees whose claims are not so attractive to counsel could
elect to pursue the statutory remedy. This statute would, however, limit recovery
to reinstatement or alternatively two years' front pay, back pay, costs of finding
employment (e.g. outplacement services) and attorneys' fees. Hearings under that
statute should be adjudicated by an administrative agency or arbitrator. Both
could draw heavily on experience in civil rights or arbitration of employee
grievances in the organized sector. Both parties could be represented in the
hearing, enabling them to rely on attorneys and labor relations specialists with
vast experience in employee relations.
This scheme would protect employees at-will, rather than those under either
a contract for a definite term or a collective bargaining agreement. While
attractive to employers, limits on remedies, particularly the unavailability of
punitive damages or damages for pain and suffering, will not likely be sufficient
to overcome their objections.
Employers are currently able to evade responsibility for most discharges of
at-will employees. Nevertheless, the rights of individual employees must be
protected somehow, as most states are realizing. The statutory scheme should be
an option or, in the alternative, large damage awards should be more readily
available to employees who are able to prove that they are entitled to relief under
a recognized exception to the employment-at-will rule. If employers strenuously
object to limited protection for discharged employees, they might prefer having
Ohio courts move toward recognizing the tort of wrongful discharge or
constructive discharge. The imminent danger of monetary losses might persuade
the employers that the statutory remedy is indeed a reasonable one.
CONCLUSION

Authors have suggested various ways in which to assault the employment-atwill doctrine. Many states have actually been slow to erode the doctrine. In two
states where the erosion was allowed to grow unchecked, however, that erosion
has been slowed. In California, the judiciary decided to attack the onslaught of
damage awards in the Foley decision. The court determined that actions under
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would be limited
to a contract cause of action and would no longer give rise to tort damage awards.
Pressure from employers in Montana led to a legislative response to the rising
damage awards. Thus legislation has been seen as a solution to both insufficient
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employee protection and overly generous employee awards.
While the efforts and ideas of the authors are admirable, it is doubtful that a
solution to this problem will be forthcoming in the near future. Many states do
not seem to realize the extent of the problem; awards have been relatively small
and the work force remains largely silent, partly because the current system is
inaccessible.
Legislative involvement would require serious lobbying by
employers who, as in Montana, seek to limit monetary awards. In many states,
like Ohio, however, it is difficult to reach a jury, let alone receive a huge damage
award.
Employers will continue to employ law firms to help with preventive
measures, such as drafting employee handbooks to avoid contractual obligations
and providing training seminars to supervisors so they avoid making
representations that might give rise to contractual obligations or detrimental
reliance. Even in states that are not on the forefront of creativity on the wrongful
discharge scene, employers would rather not pave the way. If a legislative
solution is to arrive, it will likely come from the federal level.
Meanwhile, where does the current situation leave our young professional
attorney who is trying to decide whether to file suit? We have reviewed her best
options should she choose to file, and some of the inherent pitfalls in participating
in such highly emotional litigation. The trauma may be avoided by negotiating
an attractive separation agreement and avoiding suit altogether.
The negotiated settlement, however, sends a bad message to the employer that
its actions will continue to go unchallenged and unpunished. The employer will
be saved the expense of litigation and possible exposure to more significant
damages. With the difficulties most employees face in obtaining an attorney,
financing the litigation, and the potential emotional upheaval, the employee may
have very little choice and will let the employer get away with the termination.
There is another major reason the settlement may be the attorney's most
attractive option. The horrors of pursuing employment litigation do not end with
the expense and emotional trauma of the suit itself. Will another corporation or
law firm seriously consider hiring an attorney who has sued her previous
employer?
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